State of Utah v. Danny Pierce : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
State of Utah v. Danny Pierce : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James P. Rupper; Attorneys for Appellant.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Barbara Bearnson; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Pierce, No. 880346 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1129
LTAS-: COUrtT OF APPEALS 
UT'H 
DGCul/.e'.*! 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. S&215&. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, \ 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
vs. ; 
DANNY PIERCE, \ 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
! Case No. 880346-CA 
: Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF FALSE AND FRAUDULENT INSURANCE 
CLAIM, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE BOYD 
PARK, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
JAMES P. RUPPER (2825) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
43 East 200 North, P. 0. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Attorney for Appellant 
tt* JUL 11988 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Case No. 880346-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF FALSE AND FRAUDULENT INSURANCE 
CLAIM, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE BOYD 
PARK, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
JAMES P. RUPPER (2825) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
43 East 200 North, P. 0. Box ML" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Attorney for Respondent Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Authorities ii 
Statement of Jurisdiction 1 
Nature of Proceeding 1 
Statement of Issues 1 
Statutes 2 
Statement of Case 2 
Summary of Argument 5 
POINT I 6 
THE INFORMATION WAS DEFECTIVE AS IT FAILED TO PLEAD 
SPECIFIC FACTS AS TO WHY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID 
NOT BAR THE PROSECUTION OF THIS OFFENSE. 
POINT II 9 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT THE PROSECUTION OF THE DEFENDANT WAS BROUGHT 
WITHIN THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS? 
POINT III 11 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY PLACING THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF ON THE DEFENDANT. 
POINT IV 12 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Conclusion 13 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-302(1)(a) 2, 7, 12 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-303(a) 2, 8, 12 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-412 1,2 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-6-521 1,2 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) 1 
CASES 
Ex parte Davis, 13 Cal. App. 2d 109, 111, 56 P.2d 302 (1936) . .8 
In re Albert B. Demillo on Habeas Corpus, 121 Cal. Rptr. 725, 
14 C. 3d 598, 535 P. 2d. 1181, 1183 (Cal. 1975) . . . . 8, 9 
Padie v. State, 557 P.2d 1138 (Alaska 1976) 8 
People v. Crosby, 25 Cal. Rptr. 847, 58 C.2d 713, 375 P.2d 
831 (Cal. 1962) 12 
People v. Garfield, 219 Cal. Rptr. 196, 40 C.3rd 192, 707 
P.2d 258 (Cal. 1985) 11 
People v. VcGee, 1 Cal. 2d 611, 613, 36 P.2d 378, 379 (1934) . .8 
People v. Zamora, 134 Cal. Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75 (Cal. 1976) 
8, 11 
State v. Fogel, 16 Ariz. App. 246, 492 P.2d 742, (Ariz. 
App. 1972) 8 
State v. Ladely, 82 Wash. 2d 172, 509 P.2d 658 (Wash 1973) . . 10 
State v. Wyman, 198 Kan. 666, 426 P.2d 26 (Kan. 1967) . . . . 10 
ii 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Criminal Law, 23A C.J.S., Section 1132 10 
The Statute of Limitations In Criminal Law; A Penetrable 
Barrier to Prosecution, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630 (1934) . . .7 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF I JTAH, : 
F l a i i i t a f f - I t e s p :)t :t le t i t , 
v s . : 
DANNY PIERCE, 
D e f e r 1 d a r 11 - A p p e 11 a i i t • 
C a s e N o . 8 8 0 3 4 6 - C A 
Ca tegory Nc 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
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II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE 
PROSECUTION OF THE DEFENDANT WAS BROUGHT WITHIN THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS? 
III. THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY PLACING THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON 
THE DEFENDANT. 
IV. THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
STATUTES 
Section 76-6-521, Utah Code 1987-88 
Section 76-6-412, Utah Code 1987-88 
Section 76-1-302(1)(a), Utah Code 1987-88 
Section 76-1-303(a), Utah Code 1987-88 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On October 7, 1987, an Information was issued against the 
defendant, Danny L. Pierce charging him with submitting a false 
and fraudulent insurance claim, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Section 76-6-521 and Section 76-6-412, Utah Criminal 
Code, as amended. It alleged that on or about July 19, 1981, 
that the Defendant presented a false or fraudulent claim upon a 
contract of insurance. The prosecution was initiated some six 
years after the alleged offense and approximately two years after 
the four year statute of limitation expired. 
On December 1, 1987, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss 
the charge on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred 
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the p rosecu t ion of the o f f ense . A hear ing on the s t a t u t e of 
l imi ta t ion issue was held before the t r i a l court on December 16, 
1987. 
At the hearing, the trial court heard evidence on the issue 
of whether statute of limitations had run on this offense. The 
defendant objected to the procedure arguing that the State had 
the burden of showing that prosecution was brought in a timely 
manner. H. T. p. 3. The trial court responded: 
ffI think where you have raised it as a defense in this case and 
it becomes your burden to prove that." H. T. p. 4. The defendant 
objected to this procedure stating that it was the Statefs 
obligation to show that prosecution was brought within the 
statute of limitations. H. T. p. 4. After being overruled, the 
defendant then called several witnesses to demonstrate that the 
local police and the aggrieved party knew of the offense or 
should have known of the offense at the time. The original 
investigating officer, Detective Wilkins testified; (H. T. p. 6) 
the police who interviewed the two juveniles who reported the 
truck missing testified; ( H. T. p. 45) the insurance agent who 
sold the policy to the defendant, Mr. Darwin Cottle, testified; 
(H. T. p. 53) the claims agent, Mr. Ned Walker, testified; (H. 
T. p. 61) and the Orem City Attorney, Mr. Paul Johnson, 
testified; (H. T. 78). 
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The hearing remained open in order for the defendant to 
obtain the testimony of two other witnesses• One of those two 
witnesses testified the morning of the trial prior to the case 
being presented before the jury. T. 9-15. The trial court after 
receiving the testimony of that witness reaffirmed its decision 
to deny the defendant's motion to dismiss. T. 15. 
The Defendant requested two jury instructions based on the 
statute of limitations. 
MR. RUPPER: The defendant has requested that two other 
instructions be presented with respect to the Statute 
of Limitations. The court has refused to instruct the 
jury with respect to those two other instructions one 
deals with four year Statute of Limitation period and 
one deals with the Statute of Limitations arising under 
76-1-303(a) of the Utah Code Annotated. 
It is the defendant's position that the State has 
the burden of proof and proving that the offense 
actually occurred within the Statute of Limitation 
period and that the jury must find on that issue that 
the crime was actually brought within the Statute of 
Limitations before they can render a verdict of guilty. 
THE COURT: Let me for the record indicate that 
the instructions that counsel were to submit all jury 
instructions three days prior to the date of trial. 
That the two instructions regarding the Statute of 
Limitations were submitted the morning of the trial but 
the court still considered those nevertheless and 
refused them because there was a motion pending before 
the court with regard to the Statute of Limitations 
which the court has ruled on in substance saying that 
the Statute of Limitation have not been violated but 
that ruling maybe changed by the court upon hearing the 
testimony of one additional witness which will be here 
today or which has at least been subpoenaed by the 
defendant to be here today. The court will reconsider 
that motion after hearing the testimony of that witness 
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today during the time of trial and then the court will 
further rule on that motion at the end of trial or at 
least, we will go through with the jury and just as 
well have the case over with and you put that witness 
on and then I will reconsider your motion. T. 3-4. 
Because of this procedural posture the trial court had 
essentially foreclosed the defendant's right to pursue the 
statute of limitations matter before the jury. T. p. 4. The 
court had indicated that it would consider the matter on motion 
and rule on the statute of limitations issue as matter of law. It 
would not allow the defendant to raise the issue to the jury. 
As a result the jury did not consider evidence with respect to 
the limitation period and were not instructed on that matter. 
(Compare the facts raised at the hearing and those presented at 
the trial.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Proof that a prosecution was begun within the statute of 
limitations is element of the offense and confers jurisdiction 
upon the court. The State must specifically plead facts 
supporting its position that the statute of limitations has been 
complied with in each case. Failure to do so is grounds for 
reversal because the court lacks jurisdiction. 
The court may rule as a matter of law on questions involving 
the applicability of the statute of limitations. However, where 
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questions of fact are presented the matter must be submitted to a 
jury for determination. 
Non-compliance with the statute of limitations is not an 
affirmative defense to be raised by the defendant. But compliance 
is an affirmative responsibility of the State and must be proven 
before a jury where there are questions of fact for 
determination. There were in this case significant and 
substantial evidentiary questions for the jury to determine as to 
whether the police or the aggrieved party knew or should have 
known about the commission of the offense within the four year 
statute of limitations period. 
The trial court by refusing to instruct the jury on these 
issues foreclosed their consideration of these matters, denying 
the defendant due process and committing reversible error. 
POINT I 
THE INFORMATION WAS DEFECTIVE AS IT FAILED TO PLEAD 
SPECIFIC FACTS AS TO WHY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID 
NOT BAR THE PROSECUTION OF THIS OFFENSE. 
A time limitation in a criminal case is entirely a creature 
of statute. At common law the generally accepted rule was that no 
lapse of time bars the king (nullum tempus occurrit regi), a 
doctrine that still largely prevails in England. Limitation 
statutes originated in civil law jurisdictions and were widely 
adopted in America during the colonial era to limit the authority 
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of the state to prosecute individuals on stale charges. 
The purposes of limitation statutes are manifold. First, 
they limit the authority of the state to continue prosecutions 
for old wrongs. Second, they secure for criminal trials the best 
evidence that can be obtained in a timely manner. Third, they 
notify the defendant that he can cease preserving proofs of his 
innocence. Fourth, they discourage the public degradation 
attendant upon the publication of forgotten crimes. Fifth, they 
exacts diligence from prosecutors and police to prosecute crimes 
quickly giving the most benefit to the deterrent effect of 
prosecution. Sixth, they allocate the resources of the State to 
current criminal activity and not old problems. Finally, they are 
a recognition that in the absence of recent criminal activity on 
the part of an individual, a prosecution on an ancient offense by 
that offense is somewhat pointless lacking merit. Note, The 
Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to 
Prosecution, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630 (1954). 
Utah's statute of limitation was adopted in 1973 and has 
had only minor technical changes since that time. It basically 
provides that felony prosecutions shall be commenced within four 
years from the date of commission. Section 76-1-302 (1 )(a) Utah 
Code 1987-88. However, when the period has expired on offense 
which has a material element of which is fraud or a breach of 
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fiduciary obligation, then the period is extended one year from 
the date of discovery by a person who has legal duty to represent 
an aggrieved party. This exception does not, however, extend the 
period of limitation by more than three years. So it is possible 
for an individual to be prosecuted for such an offense within 
seven years from the date of commission. Section 76-1-303(a) Utah 
Code 1987-88. 
The substantial majority of states treat a statute of 
limitation as being jurisdictional. Padie v. State, 557 P.2d 1138 
(Alaska 1976); State v. Fogel, 16 Ariz.App. 246, 492 P.2d 742 
(Ariz.App. 1972); People v. Zamora, 134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 
75 (Cal. 1976). Hence, the trial court has no jurisdiction over 
the accused if the prosecution fails to initiate a case in timely 
manner; the prosecution is barred. The Court states in In Re 
Demillo: 
It has long been established that the statute of 
limitations is jurisdictional in nature, and that 
ff[t]he point may therefore be raised at any time, 
before or after judgment." (People v. McGee (1934) 1 
Cal. 2d 611, 613, 36 p.d 378, 379.) The defense is thus 
cognizable on habeas corpus, and is not waived by a 
failure to assert it below. (In re Davis (1936) 13 Cal. 
App.2d 109, 111, 56 P.2d 302.) In Re Demillo, 121 
Cal.Rptr. 725, 14 C.3d 598, 535 P.2d 1181, 1183 (Cal. 
1975) 
The prosecution must plead additional facts as why the 
prosecution is not barred where on the face of the information 
it indicates that the offense was committed beyond the statute of 
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limitations period. The Court in In Re Demillo concluded that 
where the pleadings failed to plead additional facts that the 
conviction must be vacated because the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction. Other courts are in accord with this rule. 
Annotation, 52 A.L.R.3d 922(1973). In the instant case, the 
pleading clearly fails to allege facts as to why the State should 
be able to maintain its charge against the defendant. The State 
could have alleged additional facts, but failed to do so. 
Therefore, the conviction should be reversed. 
POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT THE PROSECUTION OF THE DEFENDANT WAS BROUGHT 
WITHIN THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS? 
In the instant case, the defendant brought a motion to 
dismiss and the trial court granted a hearing on the motion to 
dismiss. The trial court treated the issue similar to an 
affirmative defense in a civil case, which must be raised and 
proved by the defendant. The trial then ruled on the matter as 
an issue of law, denying the defendant a dismissal. T. 4 
A statute of limitations question is not matter which can be 
resolved by the trial court fully as an issue of law if 
questions of fact exist. The prevailing rule is that where a 
question of fact is involved it is for the jury to say whether a 
prosecution was begun within the period of limitations. State v. 
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Wyman, 198 Kan. 666, 426 P.2d 26 (Kan. 1967); State v. Ladely, 82 
Wash.2d 172, 509 P.2d 658 (Wash 1973). The effect on the 
limitation of the dismissal of a former indictment and the 
presentation of a present indictment is cited as typical question 
of law for the court. Criminal Law, 23A C.J.S. Section 1132. 
A number of important factual questions should have been 
resolved by the jury. Did the Orem City Police have sufficient 
information concerning the incident to know or should have known 
that an offense had been committed which required their 
investigation? This is question of fact to be resolved by the 
jury not the judge. It requires weighing of evidence and judging 
the credibility of the witnesses. For example, is the police 
denial that they did not know of any offense believable, when the 
police knew that the defendant was having financial difficulties, 
(H.T. p. 11, 71) that he applied for insurance only five days 
before the alleged theft, (H.T. p. 9, 66) that car was stripped 
in an unusual manner and transported to the scene, (H.T. 9) that 
they suspected the defendant knew too much about the location of 
the vehicle, and that they requested a polygraph of the defendant 
(H.T. 12-14). Should the State be allowed to claim benefit of the 
exception extending the statute of limitations under those 
conditions when the individuals with a legal duty to prosecute 
knew those facts and should have known that criminal activity was 
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a foot during the initial four year statute of limitation. 
Other factual questions should have been put to the jury 
concerning whether or not the Orem City prosecutor learned of the 
offense over a year prior to the prosecution. It was clear that 
he had a meeting with the wife of the defendant and her neighbor 
concerning the defendant. H.T. p. 78. Did that meeting involve 
information which imposed on him a legal duty to prosecute? 
Utah's statute of limitation is like many others in that it 
states that the time period begins when the offense is completed. 
People v. Garfield, 219 Cal.Rptr. 196, 40 C3d 192, 707 P.2d 258 
(Cal. 1985). In the instant case, the offense was completed when 
the claim was submitted which was on or about July 21, 1981. T. 
59. If the police or the aggrieved party knew or should have 
known that the offense had been committed, then the four year 
statute of limitation should limit the State from prosecution 
outside that time frame. See People v. Zamora, 557 P.2d at 90-1. 
In this case, there are significant and substantial factual 
issues present which required this matter to be submitted to a 
jury for determination. 
POINT in 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY PLACING THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE 
DEFENDANT. 
The bar of the statute of limitations is a jurisdictional 
defect rather than simply an affirmative defense which must be 
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raised by special plea, and the burden is upon the state to 
establish that the offense was committed within the applicable 
period of limitation. If the State fails to meet that burden, the 
appellate court must vacate or reverse the judgment. People v. 
Crosby, 25 Cal.Rptr. 847, 58 C.2d 713, 375 P.2d 831 (Cal. 1962). 
It follows that where the trial court treated the matter similar 
to an affirmative defense and placed the burden of proof on the 
defendant that the trial court committed error. H.T. 3-4. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The defendant requested two instructions on the applicable 
statute of limitations. One instruction requested that the jury 
be instructed as to the requirements of Section 76-1-302(1 )(a) 
and the other instruction focused on the requirements of Section 
76-1-303(a). Both instructions were rejected by the court. The 
court effectively cut off any meaningful consideration of the 
statute of limitations issue by failing to instruct the jury with 
respect to these requirements. T. 3-4, H.T. p. 43. 
As outlined previously in this brief, where a question of 
fact exists as to whether a statute of limitation has been met, 
it is for a jury to determine not the judge. Because this was not 
done in this case, the jury did not consider whether the offense 
was brought within the applicable statute of limitation. It did 
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not apply the law because it was not instructed upon special 
circumstances and the law applicable to those circumstances. It 
did not consider those matters because the State failed to 
present evidence on those matters to the jury. The State did not 
present evidence as why the charge was brought two years after 
the four year statute of limitation to the jury. Hence, the jury 
did not consider the timeliness of the State1s prosecution and 
could not have found that the court had jurisdiction to prosecute 
the defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court lacked jurisdiction because the pleading was 
defective in that the State failed to aver facts with respect to 
the statute of limitations. Second, the trial court committed 
error in ruling on the disputed factual claim without submitting 
it to a jury. The question as to whether the State discovered the 
offense was a question of fact. Third, the trial court committed 
error by treating the matter as affirmative defense and by 
placing the burden of proof on the defendant. The State has the 
burden of proof and should have proved that statute of limitation 
was complied with beyond a reasonable doubt. Fourth, the jury 
should have been instructed on the statute of limitation and its 
applicability in this case. 
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RESPECTFULLY submitted thi day of June, 1988. 
AMES P 
Attorney Defendant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of the Defendant-Appellant to the office 
of Mr. David L. Wilkinson, Utah Attorney General, 236 Sj^ ate 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid this^ S^ 
day of June, 1988. 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM-EXHIBIT # 1 
STATUTES 
Section 76-1-302(1) Accept as otherwise provided in this 
part, prosecutions for other offenses are subject to the 
following periods of limitation: (a) A prosecution for felony or 
negligent homicide shall be commenced within four years after it 
is committed; (b) A prosecution for a misdemeanor other than 
negligent homicide shall be commenced within two years after it 
is committed; (c) A prosecution for any infraction shall be 
commenced within one year after it is committed. (2) A 
prosecution is commenced upon finding and filing of an indictment 
by a grand jury or upon filing of a complaint or Information. 
Section 76-1-303 If the period prescribed in subsection 76-
1-302(1) has expired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced 
for: (a) any offense a material element of which is either 
fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation within one year after 
discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party or by a person who 
has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved party and who is 
himself not a party to the offense, but in no case shall this 
provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by 
more than three years. 
Section 76-6-321 Every person who represents, or causes to 
be presented, any false or fraudulent claim, or any proof in 
support of any such claim, upon any contract of insurance for the 
payment of any loss, or who prepares, makes or subscribed any 
account, certificate of survey, affidavit or proof of loss, or 
other book, paper or writing, with intent to present or use the 
same, or to allow it to be presented or used, in support of any 
such claim is punishable as in the matter prescribed for theft of 
property of like value. 
ADDENDUM-EXHIBIT,.#
 r2 
b' .RCl ' i lC .URTOf 
STEVEN B. KILLPACK }M> 
Utah County Attorney c\ * '•••• • 
37 East Center, Suite 200
 m . y to"! 
Provo, Utah 84601 (V,T 7 U 02 Rn « ' 
OREM DEPARTMENT, EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P | a ' n t i f f . " I N F O R M A T I O N 
vs. • 
DANNY L. PIERCE J 
DOB: 1 0 - 1 8 - 5 3 Criminal No. 
Defendant®. : %7/00//Z3 
1458 South 605 East 
Or em, Utah 
STEVEN B. KILLPACK, Utah County Attorney, State of Utah, accuses the defeniiant(s) of the following 
crime(s): 
FALSE OR FRAUDULENT INSURANCE CLAIM, a Second Degree Felony, 
in violation of 76-6-521 and 76-6-412, Utah Criminal Code, as 
amended, in that he, on or about July 19, 1981, in Utah County, 
Utah, did present or cause to be presented a false or fraudulent 
claim upon a contract of insurance for the payment of a loss and 
said claimed loss was an operable motor vehicle. 
This Information is based on evidence sworn to by: B r u c e W i l k i n s , O r em PD 
Authorized for ptMteution by: / --r^)/f,-Uf^ 'C'KJX^-' 6 
COMPLAINANT 
Subscribed and sworn to before me 
this(_l2^day#z£^19 - £ Z -
DEPUTY / / (J JUDGE 
Estimated time for preliminary hearing: 
ADDENDUM-EXHIBIT # 3 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e S t a t e must p r o v e t h a t t h e 
o f f e n s e was c o m m i t t e d w i t h i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p e r i o d of t h e 
S t a t u t e of L i m i t a t i o n . I f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n was n o t commenced 
w i t h i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p e r i o d , t h e n t h e d e f e n d a n t s h o u l d be 
a c q u i t t e d . A p r o s e c u t i o n i s commenced upon t h e f i l i n g of a 
c o m p l a i n t o r i n f o r m a t i o n . A p r o s e c u t i o n fo r a f e l o n y s h a l l be 
commence w i t h i n four y e a r s a f t e r i t i s commi t t ed . 
Utah Code S e c t i o n 7 6 - 1 - 3 0 2 ( 2 ) 1987-88 
Utah Code S e c t i o n 7 6 - 1 - 3 0 2 ( 1 ) ( a ) 1987-88 
ADDENDUM-EXHIBIT # 4 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
I f t h e f o u r y e a r p e r i o d ha s e x p i r e d , a p r o s e c u t i o n may 
n e v e r t h e l e s s be commenced fo r any o f f e n s e , a m a t e r i a l e l emen t of 
which i s f r a u d , w i t h i n one yea r a f t e r d i s c o v e r y of t h e o f f e n s e by 
an a g g r i e v e d p a r t y o r by a p e r s o n who h a s a l e g a l d u t y t o 
r e p r e s e n t an a g g r i e v e d p a r t y and who i s h i m s e l f no t a p a r t y t o 
t h e o f f e n s e , b u t i n no c a s e s h a l l t h i s p r o v i s i o n e x t e n d t h e 
p e r i o d of l i m i t a t i o n by more t h a n t h r e e y e a r s . 
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'iwMHHHMHH»«wwB-?4-81 CONTACTED PY WALKER WHO SAID THAT THEY WOOED POT 
UP lOO DOLLARS IF WE WOOED POT UP THE OTHER »<> HOLLARS TO NAME II IE 
POLYGRAPH RON* 3 SAID THAT I WOULD CHECK WITH IT. WTGHTMAN, I HID AND 
LT. WIGIITMAN SAID U IAT IIIAI' WOOED BE AI..RIOIIT. I CONTACTED WALKER AND 
NOTIFIED M M AND THEN TR1IV.H TO CONTACT CLARK TEBBS, DOT HIT WAS NOT IN. A 
MESSAGE.: WAS LEFT EUR HIM TO CONTACT Ml'- » XK)tKK«-K--)':K-K-KKK-ICX-K-H-K*iHt-»x-H-«iv*«-«*KK-K-KH 
K«***r.*K*****K&-2X5~m CI. ARK TEDDS SAID THAT I IF WOULD DE ABLE TO GET A 
POLYGRAPH ROM EITHER ON WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY AT 6 J 00 l\M, CONTACTED 
I TERSE AND I Hi: SAT D THAT THURSDAY AT 6J0O P T L WOULD DE FINE* A COPY 01 
1*1-11 r > REPORT WAS I EF r AT CI .ARK TEBBS 0FFICE*-K-O'>K-^ >c>t:<-ttK*^ ^^  
*-H*:-K***>;*^KK->O:0--20- 0:1. THIS 01T 'TCI. R GONTACTD DY NLD WALKER WHO SAID •< 
!"HAT PIERCE DID NOT' 00 IN 10 TAKE HIE POL YORAi TL THERE IS Hi.) I N D I C O ION 
Wl !Y HI DT D NOT T Ai K IT * •)V*-MW^«*»:-$£->:»:$H^:*IW^VM»W^ 
K**X***K-*-KX-KI:1~::>^--0:I. lEBttS WAS NO I' T N WHEN I CALLED, DIET I LEFT A MESSAGE 
f OR HIM TO CAI I. 01' ABOUT PJ ERCF»**i*:«*(•«*{•>;*{««•>{•>(«*•>:•««->;»;»;•««•>?••>•>•*•***•*< i.-x *•*•**•*•*•;(•*«* 
^«*K*K;()HH«*i:!-31-.8;|. 1EBBS CALLED AND INDICATED THAT PIERCE SAID THAT 
III: DID NOT WANT TO TAKE THE POLYGRAPH BECAUSE: HE WAS INSTRUCTED BY HIS 
ATTORNEY TO NOT TAKE THE POLYGRAPH, AND TEBBS INDICATED THAI PIERCE WILL 
NOT TAKE: A POI. YGRAE'R A T A N Y R A T E • * * * * * « •>>' * •>' >«•* * « **•« •« >' «« >: * * * •>'•*• * *• »* * ;- * *>';:);* **>••;•: 
VrXXKVxv-HXK-v-'? \ 01 CONTACTED DY IT IF COM PATTEN FROM A LAW FIRM AND HE 
iNDIOATED THAT P H RCF WAS IMS CLIENT AND THAT III:. I IAD INSTRUCTED HIM NOT Tu 
TAKE A POLYGRAPH BECAUSE Hi: PERSONALLY DIDN'T BEITEVE THAT THEY WERE 
ACCURATE AND THAT IT MIGHT INDICATED THAT HIS CLIENT DTD DO SOMETHING 
WRUNG, WHEN IN FACT HE DIDN'T, SO HI.-: INSTRUCTED HIS CLIENT TO NOT I HKI. i I IE 
T'(H. YGRAE'M*•>'«***•»•:•>(•>:•>• v.•>(•)•.-KK-X•>:•;:*:•);«•><•>:•>!*•>; >tr.-vrv.•>:«*:•>;•>;•>;•>(*(>s>;*•>:x«•*••>(•>:*;-•>:•«•;:•><••>.r;•)•:>rK•><«-*->I +:*•>;*•>; 
*xx»**M-}iK»{-7 -n -SI NEO WALKER CAME IN AND HE INDICATED 'THAT ME LAD ;TONE 
SOME BACK) iROOND (TUCK ON PIERCE AND THERE WAS SOME SHAKY THINGS ON HIM AND 
THAT AT THIS POINT, THEY STILT. WANT P TERSE TO TAKE HIE POLYGRAPI I. I 
:!NB1 ACTED THAI AS U| NOW, Tl IITE IS NOTHING TOR US TO DO IF NONE OF THE 
FRIENDS 0I-' PIERCE WANTS TO TELL US ANYTHING ADOOT Till.;: THEFT AND PIERCE •»• 
W.U..L NOT TAKE: 'TIE POLYGRAPH TEST, WALKER SAID THAT' HE Will.. STILL CHECK 
SOME THINGS OUT AND IF ANYTHING DEVELOPS HE WILL GET BACK WITH M E > * « * * K » S V H 
•):*•*:*«•-**.•**.•*«<,•» I'j-C'i CONTACTED DY NED WAI KIR (P.O. ',i'5C P.P. 785- -vi50.1 ) 
AND HE SAID THAT I IE WAS OCONTO TO HAVE TC PAY PIERCE BECAUSE THEY DID NOT 
HAUL ENOUGH EVIDENCE NOT TO PAY HTM I . VE N THOUGH HE' RAD A GOO,'. I'-EEL INC. THAT 
THERE WAS GOME FRAUMUIENT ACTIVITIES THERE. WALKER SAID 'VIA! HE HAD 
TALKED TO FRANK ANDRASI ON AND HI INDICATED THAT HI WAS Will! PIERCE:. AND 
THAI' AFTER' THAI HI- WAS VERY SKE TCHY ADOOT WHERE VHEY WENT THAT NIGHT AND 
IN WHAT VEIIIC! E AND WHO THEY WERE WITH AND WALKER SAID THAT HE FELT THAT 
HIS STATEMENT WAS NOT TRUE. AT THIS POINT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO 
PROSTIOUTE PIERCE OR TO CARRY ON ANYTHING FURTHER. •:•«*****•**** *********** **•':•*• 
K*x**«*Kfc!t**K*-*MTiET* BRUCE W ILK INS 
H 
4-07 THIS OFFICER WAS CONTACTED DY E'AOI JOHNSON WHIT IS THE LIT v AT TORN! Y 
FOR THE CITY OF OR! 11.1 II" ADVISED THAT I IE HAD JUST TALKED WITH PUSS HJNSA!\i..E 
ABOUT DANNY PIERCE ON A CTVAI. MAT T! R THAT DANNY WAG PERSUING .••GAINST I'ilE 
CITY* WHIT..E TALKING WITH HUNSAKER, l-:0:TS ADVISED 10 HIM THAT THE TRUCK !N 
THIS REPORT WAJi> NEVER STOLEN, DUT THAT IT WAS TAKEN TO THE OREM PARK AND 
STRIPPED AND THEN DUMPTED OVER THE EDGE SO THAT DANNY PIERCE COULD 
COI I..FCT THE INSURANCE ON THE VEHICLE< HUNSAKER TOLD HTM THAT DANNY PIERCE 
WAS HAVING FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AND THAT HE HUD INSURED THE TRUCK FOR ONLY 
